Zimbabwe: There Are No Angels In Politics

DESPITE the public posturing and differences in the characterisation of the negotiations, it is clear that something is going on behind the scenes as the politicians try to find a solution to the country’s chronic problems. The public posturing merely represents the normal jousting for positional superiority in the talks. This is an attempt to assess the factors that might influence the inevitable negotiations. The paucity of legitimacy is Zanu PF’s greatest weakness. President Robert Mugabe got the result that he wanted on 27 June because it adorned him with legal power. But Morgan Tsvangirai’s withdrawal and the negative judgment passed by the main election observer missions left Mugabe’s legitimacy in tatters. Tsvangirai on the other hand may not have the legal power but he rides on the crest of moral authority derived from victories in the Parliamentary and initial Presidential elections on 29 March. This gave Tsvangirai and the MDC, a large measure of international recognition. But he, too, knows that although inhibited by a lack of legitimacy, Zanu PF remains the de facto government. Mugabe seeks legitimacy through the negotiated settlement, whilst, through the same process, Tsvangirai seeks to gain a legal foothold in government. Tsvangirai knows that the fight for democracy requires the MDC to have some influence in government. The recent electoral farce demonstrated, quite markedly, that the real power to determine the leadership question is held by those in control of the security forces. Mugabe owes his current position to the top men in uniform. Conversely, Tsvangirai’s Achilles Heel has long been the inability to draw power from the security structure. The men in uniform have been the single greatest stumbling block in Tsvangirai’s passage to power. They will remain key players in the negotiating process because any outcome will, ultimately, need their support. They will favour an outcome that protects not just Mugabe but, importantly, their own security and welfare. The negotiating process will, therefore, be heavily influenced by the demands and interests of the uniformed men. Both Zanu PF and the MDC suffer from chronic factional divisions. The result is that in negotiating for a new Zimbabwe, each of the internal factions is positioning itself not only against the other party but also against each other. One faction could prove to be an impediment to negotiations if it feels that it would concede space to the other in the final outcome. Ultimately, each faction in the respective parties will seek representation in any new government. It could be a large, complicated and expensive government. However, whilst Zanu PF somehow manages to maintain a brave face of unity even at the hardest of times, the MDC still exhibits signs of indiscipline that could quite easily be exploited by Zanu PF in the negotiating process. A party that fails to unite, let alone in which two candidates from the same faction contest against each other, leaves itself vulnerable to Zanu PF’s adeptness at playing the opposition against each other by handing out Presidential gifts. We have already seen how Zanu PF can exploit these divisions in the way it managed to obtain a photo opportunity with the MDC’s Arthur Mutambara on 5 July 2008, when the MDC Tsvangirai stayed away from the Thabo Mbeki meeting. A more unified opposition could have taken a common position. Zanu PF will negotiate with them as two formations and will continue to play them against each other. Zanu PF has transformed a once prosperous economy into a basic economy of hunter-gatherers, literally surviving from hand to mouth. The trouble is that it shows neither a clue nor the facility to solve the chronic economic problems. The rot has begun to affect the empires of Zanu PF Oligarchs who are now desperate for a settlement. The MDC’s strength lies in its promises of a better future based largely on the support of the international community who have predicated their assistance on political change. Zanu PF knows that the presence of the MDC in government has the potential to unlock various economic opportunities. It is largely for this reason, not quite a sudden realisation of the light of decency and democracy, that Zanu PF is desperate for the MDC’s hand in marriage. Mugabe’s standing in the international community has fallen miserably in the recent past. The escalating international pressure against Mugabe and support for Tsvangirai will be a key factor in the negotiations. The threat of sanctions and further isolation, particularly in Africa, will push Mugabe to a deal. Nevertheless, "Brand Mugabe" still has some residual effect, especially on some fellow African leaders, like South Africa’s President Mbeki. They still prefer a quiet exit rather than a humiliating departure, hence their support for a negotiated settlement. In some ways the international community influence is also a double-edged sword for the MDC. Its most vocal backers are the West and this has, rather unwittingly, fed directly into Mugabe’s rhetorical characterisation of the MDC as puppet of the West. Critics say the MDC took this matter for granted and did not do enough to rebut Zanu PF’s rhetoric. Mugabe and Africa have tended to respond to the vocal Western criticism instead of focussing on the local concerns. These international squabbles may derail local negotiations, for, as they say, when elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers. How the MDC handles the delicate balance between the influence and expectations of its Western and African backers will be crucial in the next few months. The unwillingness or inability of the MDC to commit to a mass uprising is something that Zanu PF has identified over the years and cemented by the threat and use of violence. Zanu PF knows that the MDC has little alternatives other than to seek the assistance of the international community. Local initiatives such as strikes, mass action, job stay-aways, etc have been tried and failed beyond the initial success of the late 1990s. Zanu PF knows, therefore, that the opposition’s hopes lie in a negotiated process. Finally, violence has both been a strength and also a weakness for Zanu PF. It is violence that led to Tsvangirai’s withdrawal from the race and paved the way for Mugabe to claim legality. Just as Zanu PF unleashed violence in Matabeleland to bring PF ZAPU to the negotiating table, so it has succeeded again to use violence to coerce the MDC into negotiations. It is, however, also a weakness of sorts because the subsequent withdrawal by Tsvangirai deprived the electoral process and outcome of the sought after legitimacy. Instead of giving it positional superiority, the outcome has left Zanu PF weaker and in need of recognition, which only a negotiated settlement might deliver. At the end of the day, the politicians will negotiate and compromise. What the ordinary men and women say will count for little. One can only hope that whatever arrangement is achieved those who purport to be fighting for democracy will not concede heavily and join the proverbial gravy train, after which it will be aluta continua for the ordinary men and women. The arrangement must always be seen as a means to an end, not an end in itself. Then again, there are no angels in politics. Alex Magaisa is based at, Kent Law School, the University of Kent and can be contacted atwamagaisa@yahoo.co.uk